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Receivers, Churches and Nonprofit Corporations:
A First Amendment Analysis
Religion has become big business. As the assets of religious corpora-
tions grow and religious bodies increasingly engage in nonworship ac-
tivities, an increase in litigation involving religious organizations should
be anticipated.
Churches are repeatedly subsumed under the general heading of non-
profit corporations in cases,2 treatises3 and statutes, and it is assumed
that that body of law is applicable. Principles which are allegedly ap-
plicable to a class may, however, be singularly inappropriate as applied
to a member of that class. This is especially so when legal rules derived
from business corporations practice are applied to religious organiza-
tions which are granted special constitutional protections. This note ex-
amines the propriety of a specific judicial remedy, receivership, in the
nonprofit context5 and in the unique nonprofit context of churches. Con-
stitutional problems are manifest when a receiver is imposed upon a
religious body, and religious organizations should find some protection
within the scope of the establishment6 and free exercise clauses of the
first amendment.' It is not, however, always obvious that a church's
first amendment rights have been abridged. Determination of the
degree to which receivership may abridge those rights requires a
' Statistics are necessarily incomplete because of theological objections raised by some
churches to the gathering and reporting of information and because many independent
churches are not affiliated with any general church or denomination to which data would be
reported. Nonetheless, 43 demoninations reported total contributions in excess of $6.2
billion in 1977. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 55
(99th ed. 1978). Almost $931 million was expended in 1970 for religious construction. By
1977, this figure had increased by 12.8%. Not included in these figures are the amounts ex-
pended by religious organizations for hospitals, schools and more specifically secular
endeavors. Id at 779. See generally A. BALK, THE RELIGION BUSINESS (1968).
' See, e.g., Gospel Tabernacle Body of Christ Church v. Peace Publishers & Co., 211
Kan. 420, 506 P.2d 1135 (1973).
See, e.g., H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS § 348 (3d ed. 1974).
See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 23-7-1.1-2(d), -3 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Only West Virginia denies
religious bodies the right to incorporate. See W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 47.
See notes 56, 67 & accompanying text infra.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see notes 92-138 & accompanying text infra.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see notes 139-70 & accompanying text infra.
Additional protection can be found in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and in the fourth amendment's guarantees against unreasonable search and
seizure. These protections are especially important inasmuch as they should be available to
secular and religious nonprofits alike. Fourth and fourteenth amendment issues are,
however, beyond the scope of this note.
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careful analysis of a given state's law. Here, focus will be placed upon
the law of California.
This note will examine the first amendment problems with applying
the remedy of receivership to churches. It will focus upon and be il-
lustrated by one California religious corporations case, Worldwide
Church of God v. Superior Court,8 and will argue that such cases must
always be adjudicated in light of the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment. Attention will be directed to the charitable trust theory9 by which
California justified its involvement in the affairs of nonprofits. Receiver-
ship will be examined in the nonprofit context, and the constitutional
ramifications of both the remedy and the charitable trust theory on
which this particular application of the remedy is based will be ex-
plored. This note will then conclude that the charitable trust theory
which gives the state standing to bring suit against the religious non-
profit offends the establishment clause and that the indiscriminate
remedy of receivership offends the free exercise clause.
WORLDWIDE CHURCH OF GOD V. SUPERIOR COURT
For over a year California courts were embroiled in litigation arising
out of the imposition of a receivership upon a nonprofit church corpora-
tion."0 In the case that engendered this imbroglio, Worldwide Church of
God v. Superior Court, the state of California sought a receiver for the
defendant church and for Ambassador College, Inc. and Ambassador In-
ternational Cultural Foundation, Inc., both nonprofit California corpora-
tions and arms of the church." Acting under statutory authority," the
' People v. Worldwide Church of God, No. C 267 607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979),
mandamus denied, Worldwide Church of God v. Superior Court, No. 31091 (Cal. March 22,
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1846 (1980), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 2974 (1980) (dismissed from L.A. Super. Ct., Oct. 16, 1980).
See notes 74-82 & accompanying text infra.
10 See Post-Guyana Hysteria, State of California Occupies Headquarters of the
Worldwide Church of God, LIBERTY, May-June, 1979, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Post-Guyana
Hysteria]; California Presses Moves on Churches, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1979, at 53, col. 1.
Political, as well as legal, concerns may have been present in Worldwide Church. It may be
argued that this case was but a political response to the emergence of the cults which have
made Jonestown, Synanon, Moonies and Scientology familiar names. Post-Guyana Hysteria,
supra, at 4.
" Joined as defendants were: Herbert Armstrong, Pastor General of the church; Stanley
Rader, general counsel and holder of numerous offices in all three church corporations;
business associates of Rader; an accounting firm which Rader joined in founding; a pro-
prietorship; and a partnership. Brief for Respondent, app. A, at 1, 444 U.S. 883 (1979). The
absence of any published opinion or finding of facts by the superior court necessitates ex-
tensive reliance upon the briefs filed with the Supreme Court in support of and in opposi-
tion to the church's petition for certiorari.
12
A nonprofit corporation which holds property subject to any public or
charitable trust is subject at all times to examination by the Attorney
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attorney general alleged that the defendants diverted assets for their
own benefit and sought an accounting and appointment of a receiver
pendente lite to prevent the continuing misappropriation of funds and
destruction of evidence.'"
The legal theory advanced by the attorney general was based upon
charitable trust principles, with the people of California portrayed as
the beneficiaries of the trust." The superior court granted the petition
ex parte and ordered the receiver "to take possession of all Church





The day after the ex parte hearing, the receiver took physical control
of church headquarters and discharged certain church employees. 8
When the church petitioned for dissolution of the temporary receiver-
ship, arguing that it violated the first amendment's free exercise
clause,'7 that petition was denied. 8 A formal hearing one week after the
ex parte action did produce some testimony regarding self-dealing, 9 and
General, on behalf of the State, to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to
what extent, if at all, it may fail to comply with trusts which it has assumed or
may depart from the general purposes for which it is formed. In case of any
such failure or departure the Attorney General shall institute, in the name of
the State, the proceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance or depar-
ture.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980).
" Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 5-6. Ordinarily the appointment of a receiver is
an extraordinary remedy, granted only where there is danger of waste or destruction of the
property in which another has an interest. 1 R. CLARK. A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE OF RECEIVERS § 54 (3d ed. 1959); see text accompanying notes 43, 58 infra. It may be
surmised that the pending sale of the college's Big Sandy campus provided the requisite
fact pattern for the court. This sale in the amount of $10.6 million was in escrow at the time
the receivership was imposed, but with the imposition of the receivership, the buyer
cancelled. In his initial petition the attorney general alleged that the property was worth
"substantially in excess of $10.6 million ... and these defendants have attempted to conceal
the true worth." Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, app. A, at 16. Since the court
ultimately ordered the receiver to consummate a sale of the property for $10.6 million, the
court may have believed that the imminent need requirement was satisfied by the attorney
general's allegations of continuing fraud, coupled with the increasing influence of Mr. Rader
and the incapacity of Mr. Armstrong. Id. app. A, at 6-10; see Post-Guyana Hysteria, supra
note 10, at 6.
" Brief for Petitioner, app. D, at 15-16, 444 U.S. 883 (1979); Brief for Respondent, supra
note 11, app. A, at 6.
" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 6-7 (footnote omitted). This charge is in the final
order. Id. app. E, at 29-30.
" Id. at 7.
"Id.
1s Id.
The respondent alleged that Rader had made personal house purchases with church
funds; that there had been dealings between the church and Rader's law, advertising and
accounting firms; and that there had been a leaseback of Rader's airplanes to the church.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, app. B, at 22-43. Testimony was also heard regarding
the shredding and removal of documents after the imposition of the receivership, id. app. B,
at 44-69, and the alteration of bylaws, id. app. B, at 70-71.
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the court formalized the receivership. The receiver was given the power
to supervise and monitor all of the business and financial operations
and activities of the Church; however, he shall not interfere therein
unless he determines, in the sound exercise of his sole discretion, that
such interference is necessary to avoid damage or loss to the Church
of any kind. And if he does so determine, then he shall have the right
to take over management and control of the Church to whatever ex-
tent that he, in the sound exercise of his sole discretion, deems
necessary.0
The court recognized the potential free exercise problem inherent in
that order, but attempted to avoid constitutional infirmity by carefully
delineating the receiver's powers.2'
Seven weeks after the receivership was first imposed, the court
agreed to its dissolution, substituting injunctive relief and directing the
church to give the attorney general's office access to its computer
center and records.' When this plan proved unworkable, a second
receiver was appointed. 3 Shortly thereafter, church members subscribed
$3.2 million to meet the $1 million stay bond set by the court.
Upon reinstitution of the receivership, the church sought a writ of
mandate or prohibition from the California Supreme Court.' A closely
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, app. E, at 28.
21 The court order stated:
10. Non-Interference by Receiver in Ecclesiastical Affairs.
It is not the purpose or intention of this Order to allow the Receiver to in-
terfere in any way with the ecclesiastical functions of the Church (as
distinguished from the College or the Foundation); and he shall not do so. This
Receivership concerns itself exclusively with the financial and business affairs
of the Church. The ecclesiastical affairs of the Church shall continue to be con-
trolled and directed by its duly authorized ecclesiastical authorities. Not-
withstanding the authority of the Receiver to terminate or suspend persons
from employment ... such termination or suspension shall in no way affect
their membership or standing in the Church.
11. Disputes as to whether a given matter is ecclesiastical.
In the event of any dispute between the Receiver and the ecclesiastical
authorities of the Church (as opposed to the College or the Foundation) over
whether or not a particular matter is ecclesiastical, the authorities aforesaid
are authorized to employ counsel to apply to this Court for a resolution of said
dispute; and said counsel may thereafter apply for reasonable compensation
from the Church funds pursuant to Court order.
Id app. E, at 30-31.
Id. at 9-10.
'3 Id app. G.
24 Id. at 10-11. When a solvent defendant is already successfully operating property, the
receiver's appointment may be stayed by the posting of a bond. See, e.g., United States v.
Dominion Oil Co., 241 F. 425 (S.D. Cal. 1917). While the attorney general originally objected
on the ground that the sureties did not meet the requirements of CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
1057 (West Supp. 1979), he later withdrew this objection. Brief for Respondent, supra note
11, app. D.
I Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, app. A. The order appointing a receiver ex parte is
appealable and usually the appropriate writ is the writ of prohibition. Golden State Glass
[Vol. 56:175
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divided court denied the petition.26 Alleging infringement of its first
amendment rights and extensive damage,m the church sought review by
the United States Supreme Court on three different occasions.' Cer-
tiorari was denied," and this case was scheduled to return to the Los
Angeles Superior Court for determination of whether wrongdoing had
occurred in the affairs of the nonprofit corporations prompted by legis-
lated changes in the state corporations code, the attorney general subse-
quently dismissed as to all defendants.'
Inferences should not be drawn from the fact that appellate courts
have denied review." Nonetheless, such decisions can be analyzed and
placed in a legal context. It is both timely and fitting to examine
receivership as a remedy in the religious nonprofit context and to
scrutinize the charitable trust theory to which attorneys general may
appeal in justifying such a remedy.2
Corp. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 384, 90 P.2d 75 (1939). However, the histoRies of the
writs of mandamus and prohibition are intertwined and "there are situations in which
either writ may be proper:' 43 CAL. JuR. 3d Mandamus and Prohibition § 1 (1978) (footnote
omitted). The writ of mandamus may control abuses of judicial discreti6n, id. § 25, while the
writ of prohibition may more specifically be used to challenge the appointment of a
receiver, id. § 103.
" No. 31091 (Cal. March 22, 1979).
" Damages of both a financial and ecclesiastical nature were attributed to the receiver-
ship. Specifically, the church charged destruction of its superior bank credit lines, favorable
vendor billing practices and balanced cash flow. Checks to media outlets for religious pro-
gramming were bounced by the receiver along with beneficent payments to needy church
members. Expected revenues during the first two months of the receivership dropped by
$2.75 million. In addition, $150,000 of church assets were spent by the receiver for his own
expenses. Losses attributed to the suit and to the receivership were set in excess of $5
million for the fiscal year. The financial loss, petitioners claimed, directly caused the
elimination or reduction of national youth programs, travel subsidies to needy members at-
tending the Feast of Tabernacles, a newsstand distribution of church publications, educa-
tional programs for the handicapped, international programs, construction and education
and training of employees. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, app. C. Petitioners further
alleged that 90 employees, including ministers, were laid off due to budget reductions im-
posed by the receiver, id. app. C, at 11, and that "[tihe receiver hired a disfellowshiped
member of the church to work at the headquarters, even though that was against the ex-
press beliefs of the church, and other church members are forbidden contact with disfellow-
shiped members." Post-Guyana Hysteria, supra note 10, at 8.
" 48 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. May 15, 1979) (No. 78-1720); 48 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. March 3,
1980) (No. 79-1348); 49 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1980) (No. 80-197).
444 U.S. 883 (1979).
" For the subsequent history of this case, see notes 82, 91 infra.
81 See generally Bice, The Limited Grant of Certiorari and the Justification of Judicial
Review, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 343 (1975); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pts. 1-2), 71
HARv. L. REV. 401, 769 (1958).
n This is especially so since the attorney general of California admitted that Worldwide




RECEIVERSHIP IN THE NONPROFIT CONTEXT
Receivership developed in the courts of equity" and was discre-
tionary with the chancellor;,' it has never been an end in itself.' As a
representative of the court, 6 the receiver is appointed to "hold, manage,
control and deal with the property which is the subject matter of, or in-
volved in, the controversy."3 ' Because the remedy is radical, and in-
volves the taking of property, the court must assure itself that no other
adequate remedy exists."
California regulates the appointment of receivers by statute." This
statute, in keeping with the drastic nature of the remedy, is strictly con-
strued by the courts."0 Generally, a precondition to the appointment of a
receiver is an adversary hearing" at which the proponent of the action
must meet a prima facie burden'2 of proving waste, loss or destruction.'3
The ex parte appointment of a receiver is, however, permitted." Though
courts once held that the proponent of an ex parte order had to meet a
more rigorous standard than the proponent of the typical order with
notice, 5 recent cases suggest that the same standard applies in both
cases." Certain statutory safeguards are imposed in an ex parte pro-
13 1 R. CLARK. supra note 13, § 46; see Davies v. Ramsdell, 40 Cal. App. 432, 183 P. 702
(1919). See generally J. POMEROY. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1330-1336 (4th ed. 1919).
1 1 R. CLARK, supra note 13, § 53; J. POMEROY, supra note 33, § 1331; see Morand v.
Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 347, 113 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1974).
,'5 1 R. CLARK, supra note 13, § 48; see Associated Creditors' Agency v. Wong, 216 Cal.
App. 2d 61, 30 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1963).
1 R. CLARK, supra note 13, § 35.
J. POMEROY, supra note 33, § 1330.
SIc § 1331; see Jackson v. Jackson, 253 Cal. App. 2d 1026, 62 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1967);
Cohen v. Herbert, 186 Cal. App. 2d 488, 8 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1960); Rogers v. Smith, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 16, 172 P.2d 365 (1946); Breedlove v. J.W. & E.M. Breedlove Excavating Co., 56 Cal.
App. 2d 141, 132 P.2d 239 (1942).
See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 564 (West 1979).
, See, e.g., Turner v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 804, 140 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1977);
Stock & Bond Guar. Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 360, 291 P. 589 (1930).
,1 Huellmantel v. Huellmantel, 125 Cal. 583, 57 P. 582 (1899).
42 See 1 R. CLARK, supra note 13, § 55; accord, Ribero v. Callaway, 87 Cal. App. 2d 135,
196 P.2d 109 (1948); Copper Hill Mining Co. v. Spencer, 25 Cal. 11 (1864). But see Moore v.
Oberge, 61 Cal. App. 2d 216, 142 P.2d 443 (1943) (requiring a preponderance of the
evidence).
13 1 R. CLARK, supra note 13, § 54.
" CAL. R. CT. 238.
" For an ex parte order, an irreparable injury, Venza v. Venza, 94 Cal. App. 2d 878, 211
P.2d 913 (1949); Tyler v. Park Ridge Country Club, 103 Cal. App. 117, 284 P. 247 (1930), and
an occurrence of the greatest emergency, Sunset Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App.
2d 389, 50 P.2d 106 (1935); Tyler v. Park Ridge Country Club, 103 Cal. App. 117, 284 P. 247
(1930), are required. Allegations based upon belief and information were generally found in-
sufficient. Golden State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 384, 90 P.2d 75 (1939).
11 "If it appears that the party seeking the appointment has at least a probable right or
interest in the property sought to be placed in receivership and that the property is in
danger of destruction, removal or misappropriation, the appointment of a receiver will not
[Vol. 56:175
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ceeding.'7 However, the effectiveness of these safeguards must be ques-
tioned, especially in the nonprofit realm. 8
Courts have been reluctant to impose the radical remedy of receiver-
ship where corporations have been defendants. Shareholders' allega-
tions of fraud and mismanagement which were based upon information
and belief have typically been insufficient to warrant the appointment
of a receiver."9 Even when specifics are alleged, the court may scrutinize
those specifics and find them wanting.' The test, at least for a profit
corporation, requires injury to a creditor51 or shareholder,52 as well as in-
be disturbed on appeal." Maggiora v. Palo Alto Inn, Inc., 249 Cal. App. 2d 706, 710, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 787, 791 (1967). The opinion in Maggiora is notable because the court upheld an ex
parte appointment where "reasonable minds might differ," id. at 711, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 791,
and where the proponent had only a "probable interest," id. Absent from Maggiora is the
typical hyperbole of "irreparable injury" and "greatest emergency." Perhaps this deletion
is no great loss. Nevertheless, if the language is symbolic, its omission may constitute some
loss. Interestingly, similar hyperbole is found in the property law of adverse possession
where adjectives such as notorious, continuous, adverse, hostile and exclusive are used. In
both receivership and adverse possession the court is concerned with depriving a party of
his property. Therefore, the use of such language may symbolize the egregious nature of an
action which would potentially infringe upon a constitutional right; if so, its loss may result
in courts proceeding less cautiously.
17 The ex parte proponent is required to post a bond
with sufficient sureties, in.an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect
that the applicant will pay to the defendant all damages he may sustain by
reason of the appointment of such receiver and the entry by him upon his
duties, in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment wrongfully,
maliciously, or without sufficient cause; and the court may, in its discretion, at
any time after said appointment, require an additional undertaking.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 566 (West 1979). To a lesser extent, the possibility of appeal of a
receivership appointment can serve as a safeguard, id, § 904.1(g) (West 1980), as can the
posting of a bond to prevent the imposition of a receivership, id. § 917.5. See note 24 &
accompanying text supra.
" The rights to appeal the appointment of a receiver and to post a bond to prevent im-
position of a receiver are minimal safeguards and obviously after the fact. The defendant in
an ex parte action may have the receivership removed either by posting a bond, by prevail-
ing on an interlocutory appeal or by both. Even so, however, the defendant may not be pro-
tected by § 566 unless the proponent has acted wrongfully, maliciously or without sufficient
cause or unless the damage to the defendant can be quantified with sufficient precision.
Such precise quantification of damages may be impossible where the harm is to a defen-
dant's good name or to a firm's good will. In the realm of nonprofit corporations or unincor-
porated associations, the product of the corporation or association tends to be an idea or a
value in contrast to a salable product, commodity or service such as in a business enter-
prise. Without a product, commodity or service, the nonprofit, to a greater extent than does
the business organization, relies upon its good name and the good will it has engendered.
Without a balance sheet which will unequivocably measure the injury done by the receiver-
ship, the nonprofit may have a difficult time showing damages.
" See, e.g., Mason v. San-Val Oil & Water Co., 1 Cal. 2d 670, 36 P.2d 616 (1934).
50 See, e.g., Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, 270 F. 388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 256 U.S.
694 (1921).
11 See, e.g., Stock & Bond Guar. Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 360, 291 P. 589
(1930).
1 See, e.g., Mason v. San-Val Oil & Water Co., 1 Cal. 2d 670, 36 P.2d 616 (1934).
1980]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
jury to the corporation itself.' Thus, that a corporation is a "going con-
cern" may be conclusive evidence in the eyes of the court that the cor-
poration has not been injured" and that a receivership should not be im-
posed.
Equity's use of this "going concern" test as a rule of thumb probably
should not be questioned where the defendant is a public issue corpora-
tion. While the test may have some value where the defendant is a close
corporation, other considerations such as family ties may be equally
significant.5 1 When, however, the defendant is a nonprofit corporation,
an entity whose purpose disavows the ordinary balance sheet under-
standing of a going concern, the inappropriateness of the going concern
test becomes obvious. 6 The going concern test undoubtedly reflects a
concern of creditor protection, but it does not stretch the imagination in
the least to postulate a nonprofit which fails the balance sheet test and
yet whose creditors feel not at all threatened because they have iden-
tified with the qualitative goals of the nonprofit.
Equally as important as the question of the appropriate candidate for
a receivership is the question of who has standing to apply for a
receivership. Originally, California was persuaded that the proponent
needed to demonstrate some right or interest in the property to be sub-
jected to the receivership. 57 Recently, this standard has been relaxed
and the appointment of a receiver is now upheld if the party seeking the
appointment has at least a probable right or interest in the property-
and there is also a danger of destruction or misappropriation." This
relaxation of the standard can be seen as paralleling courts' expansion
of the remedy's scope to cover personal or constitutional rights as well
as property rights.59
"Internal dissensions deadlocking the corporation or frustrating it or threatening its
purposes and objects, official breaches of trust, mismanagement and waste, are generally
regarded as grounds, according to usages of equity, for a receivership to protect rights."
Misita v. Distillers Corp., 54 Cal. App. 2d 244, 251, 128 P.2d 888, 892 (1942).
" "The appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy and is one which should not be in-
voked unless there is an actual or threatened cessation or diminution of the business." In re
Jamison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 35, 322 P.2d 246, 250 (1958). "Stronger proof is
essential to justify a receivership where specific and detailed evidence that the
corporation's business is being successfully conducted at a profit is presented in opposition
thereto." Golden State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 384, 396, 90 P.2d 75, 81(1939). Where a corporation may be no more than an alter ego, e.g., Sunset Farms, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 2d 389, 50 P.2d 106 (1935), or where it has been formed to
deprive a plaintiff of her rights, e.g., Patents Process, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App.
541, 282 P. 21 (1929), no such reluctance has been shown.
1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1971).
, See note 48 supra.
5 See, e.g., Takeba v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. App. 469, 185 P. 406 (1919).
s, E.g., Armbrust v. Armbrust, 75 Cal. App. 2d 272, 171 P.2d 75 (1946).
Note, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neoreceiverships to
Implement Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (1976); see Note,
[Vol. 56:175
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The property interest test for determining whether a proponent has
standing to express concern about the balance sheet of the corporation
and to claim injury when the balance sheet is precarious or reflects in-
solvency, should be seen as complementing the going concern test by
which an appropriate receivership candidate is ascertained. Creditors of
the corporation would obviously be potential plaintiffs, but even their
interest may not be sufficient to warrant the appointment of a
receiver." Shareholders are in a preferred position as potential plain-
tiffs and may prevail61 if their complaints are based upon more than
mere "information and belief.""2 An involuntary dissolution action may
also be commenced against a corporation by the attorney general 3 who
may request the appointment of a receiver. 4 The only other proponent
with standing is the court itself which may appoint a receiver on its own
motion, but such action is extremely rare. 5 The obvious conclusion to be
drawn from courts' limited recognition of potential plaintiffs where a
corporation is a defendant is that equity's admonition that the propo-
nent of the receivership motion have an interest in the property in-
volved is taken very seriously. A creditor does not, properly speaking,
have an interest in the corporate property save as that property may be
security for a debt. The state does not, properly speaking, have an in-
terest in corporate property unless state law has been violated. Con-
versely, the shareholder clearly has such a property interest.
Just as the going concern test is inappropriate in the nonprofit con-
text, so too is the property interest test for standing. Typically, a
member of a nonprofit corporation does not own shares. Even where
there has been an economic investment and shares have been issued,
the member cannot expect an economic return on his investment. When
members of a nonprofit corporation are unsuccessful in their attempt to
get a receiver appointed, it is often because of the difficulty of demon-
Appointment of an Equitable Receiver in Pennsylvania. An Unusual Remedy for an Ex-
traordinary Situation, 78 DiCK. L. REv. 536 (1974).
6O
[Ilt is settled law that courts have no power at the instance of a mere creditor
to appoint a receiver for a corporation, and thus virtually to dissolve it and
usurp the powers of its directors, until he shall first have reduced his claim to
a judgment and shall have exhausted his legal remedies.
Stock & Bond Guar. Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 360, 362-63, 291 P. 589, 590 (1930).
" "[Bjeyond question a court of equity has power to appoint a receiver in a stockholder's
suit for the purpose of preserving the assets of a corporation and [preventing] irreparable
loss or injury pending suit." Misita v. Distillers Corp., 54 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250, 128 P.2d
888, 892 (1942).
62 See, e.g., McCaslin v. Kenney, 100 Cal. App. 2d 87, 223 P.2d 94 (1950).
0 CAL. CORP. CODE § 1801 (West 1977).
Id. § 1803.
'" See, e.g., Venza v. Venza, 94 Cal. App. 2d 878, 211 P.2d 913 (1949) (divorce proceeding).
"See J. POMEROY, supra note 33, §§ 1332-1334.
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strating irreparable injury to a property interest. 7 This is not to say
that the members have lacked standing to sue such corporations;'
rather, where members have brought actions requesting receiverships,
that remedy may be thought inappropriate because of the lack of a prop-
erty interest. In contrast, when the attorney general has acted pursuant
to his statutory authority, receivers have been appointed. 9
Statutory authority exists in California for the attorney general to
bring an action against either a profit 7 or a nonprofit corporation.7 ' At-
torneys general have frequently exercised this authority in the case of
nonprofits.72 The explanation for this frequency of state action may be
found in the property interest test. Since, by definition, there cannot be
a traditional property interest in the nonprofit context, a standing void
is created. Into this void the attorney general steps to bring an action.
It is, however, begging the question to say that the attorney general
must act because of the void, for it exists only because the inap-
propriate property interest test for standing is applied to the nonprofit.
Underlying the property interest standing test there appears to be a
common sense economic presupposition that those who hold an economic
interest will readily and forcefully argue their rights to protect that in-
terest. Conversely, it may be contended that absent the compelling in-
terest of personal financial loss, individual members of nonprofit cor-
porations will be reluctant to initiate court proceedings to forestall
fraud, mismanagement or waste. 71 More than this is needed, however, to
deny nonprofit members access to the courts. It is both circular and
nonsensical to argue that because members of nonprofits lack a prop-
erty interest they will be reluctant to litigate, and then to deny the
receivership remedy to a plaintiff who is eager to litigate. Moreover,
mere reticence to litigate will not, by itself, justify the state's decision
to stand in place of reluctant plaintiffs; some state interest must also be
present.
See, e.g., Starbird v. Lane, 203 Cal. App. 2d 247, 21 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1962); Tyler v. Park
Ridge Country Club, 103 Cal. App. 117, 284 P. 247 (1930).
" See Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51 P. 841 (1897) (members,
not trustees alone, have standing).
" See, e.g., People v. Christ's Church of the Golden Rule, 79 Cal. App. 2d 858, 181 P.2d
49 (1947).
In California, the general problem of members lacking standing may now be corrected by
a new statute which allows derivative actions. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5710 (West Supp.
1979). This addition, however, would seem to point to a diminished need for state involve-
ment while the new statute concomitantly seems to increase the authority of the attorney
general. See note 80 infra.
"' CAL. CORP. CODE § 1801 (West 1977).
71 1& § 9505 (West Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980).
See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
See generally A. HIRSCHMAN. EXIT. VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
[Vol. 56:175
FIRSTAMENDMENT
A more plausible explanation for the frequency of state actions
against nonprofits is the charitable purpose frequently professed by
nonprofit corporations. Where a nonprofit corporation exists for general
religious, educational or eleemosynary reasons, it is, arguably, the peo-
ple of the state who are the beneficiaries of a trust. Thus, the state in-
terest being vindicated when the attorney general brings an action is
probably not that of the members, but that of the original donors and
present beneficiaries:
The public benefits arising from the charitable trust justify the selec-
tion of some public official for its enforcement. Since the attorney
general is the governmental officer whose duties include the protec-
tion of the rights of the people of the state in general, it is natural
that he has been chosen as the protector, supervisor, and enforcer of
charitable trusts .... 7
A pragmatic argument reaching the same result has been stated with
some precision:
[N]either the settlor nor his heirs can bring an action to enforce a
charitable trust unless he has reserved a power to do so....
[Tihe beneficiaries of a charitable trust are unknown and therefore
lack the necessary interest to bring suit to enforce the trust....
Thus it is apparent that parties other than the attorney general
only infrequently have sufficient interest to bring a suit to enforce a
charitable trust. 7
The charitable trust doctrine is a legal fiction,7 deeply entrenched in
California law77 and formerly codified in the Nonprofit Corporations
Code.78 The new Nonprofit Corporation Code omits the charitable trust
theory from the statutory language authorizing action by the attorney
7 G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT. LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411, at 409 (2d rev. ed.
1977). This is really an argument for the accountability of nonprofit corporations. A discus-
sion, however, of standards and devices of accountability is beyond the scope of this note.
11 Gray, State Attorney General-Guardian of Public Charities???, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 236, 239 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
76 See Sutter, Death of Charitable Trust Corporation Law, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 236
(1971).
7
The state, as parens patriae, superintends the management of all public
charities or trusts, and, in these matters acts through her attorney general.
Generally speaking, such an action will not be entertained at all unless the at-
torney general is a party to it. Such was the rule at common law, and it has
not been changed in this state. Even in those states, such as Massachusetts,
where, by special statute, the attorney general is instructed to prosecute such
actions, it is declared that the statute does not narrow or diminish in this
regard the common law powers incident to the office.
People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 136, 45 P. 270, 271 (1896) (citation omitted).
For a more complete discussion of the charitable trust theory, see Brown v. Memorial Nat'l
Home Found., 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 329 P.2d 118 (1958).
"' See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
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general."9 Nonetheless, the extensive power of the attorney general as it
existed under the prior codification remains undiminished. Indeed, since
the legislative history of the new Code suggests that the attorney general
shall have his new specific powers in addition to his common law
power,"' and since the charitable trust doctrine is part of his common
law power,8' it may be argued that the charitable trust doctrine is still
viable in California.2 The continuation of this doctrine is regrettable not
simply because this is an age which delights in debunking legal fictions,
but more importantly because of the constitutional questions raised
when the state attempts to regulate nonprofit corporations which are
also churches.
r, See CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West Supp. 1980).
"In addition to general common law powers over charitable institutions, the Attorney
General now has specific statutory authority to supervise charitable corporations. This
authority is continued in the proposed law." Recommendation Relating to Nonprofit Cor-
poration Law, 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 2265 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
Where any assets are subject to a charitable trust and the transaction is not in
the usual and regular course of corporate activities, the proposed law requires
the nonprofit corporation to give written notice to the Attorney General
before the transaction is consummated. This will facilitate performance of the
Attorney General's duty to supervise charitable property.
Id. at 2267; see id. at 2268.
" See note 77 supra.
See Note, Does Court Ordered Receivership Breach the Wall of Separation Between
Church and State?, 6 W. ST. U.L. REV. 269 (1979).
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9142, 9230 and 9690 were recently amended out of a concern for in-
fringement upon free exercise of religion. Ch. 1324, 1980 Cal. Stats. 5082 (1980). This ex-
pression of legislative will, effective June 1, 1981, prompted the California attorney general
to dismiss the action against the Worldwide Church of God as well as actions pending
against other religious corporations. As amended, § 9230 prohibits the attorney general
from bringing actions against religious corporations unless there has been a public solicita-
tion and fraud is suspected. The amendments to §§ 9142 and 9690 seek to fill the accoun-
tability and deterrence voids created by the new § 9230, by granting standing to members
and former members of the corporation and by encouraging criminal courts to impose
restitution sentences where persons are convicted of fraud in the name of religion. While
the legislature's grant of standing to members and to former members is certainly a
welcome change, see note 74 & accompanying text supra, any enthusiasm must be
tempered by three lingering concerns. First, § 9230(d) makes it clear that the charitable
trust theory remains a viable theory where fraud is alleged. Second, since §§ 9511 and 9512
permit the religious corporation by its articles or bylaws to restrict a member's right to in-
spect membership lists and corporate records, the standing victory won by members in §
9142 may be a hollow one without a concomitant relaxation by courts of the standard for
judging the sufficiency of initial pleadings. If, for example, a pleading based on information
and belief will not be sustained where the corporation's articles or bylaws deny the member
access to the records from which he might derive knowledge, his new-found standing will
avail him little. See notes 49, 62 & accompanying text supra. Third, the cosmetic changes
effected by the California legislature do not address the underlying free exercise problem
which exists where the corporate entity is not a church per se, but a church school or foun-
dation, not properly incorporated under § 9111. See notes 101-04 & accompanying text in-
fra. While the attorney general in Worldwide Church has dismissed as to all defendants, in-




The applicability of the first amendment's freedom of speech and
freedom of association clauses to business corporations has already been
recognized. First National Bank v. Bellottil established that state cor-
poration laws cannot abridge freedom of speech. 4 Bellotti held that a
state statute which prohibited a banking association from lobbying on
an issue not materially affecting any of the property, business or assets
of the corporation deprived the corporation of freedom of speech."
While Bellotti dealt with a business corporation, this decision should
also be applicable to nonprofits, at least to the extent of the lobbying
limitations imposed by the Internal Revenue Code.8 NAACP v.
Alabama87 established that enforcement of state nonprofit corporation
laws cannot justify abridging freedom of association rights.88 NAACP
held that Alabama's interest in determining whether the nonprofit was
conducting intrastate business in violation of state law would not be
substantially advanced by the production of membership lists, and that
such a mandate would impinge upon the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association.89 Analytically, if state corporation laws cannot
infringe upon the free speech and free association clauses, it should
follow that state corporation laws also cannot infringe upon other fun-
damental rights.
Worldwide Church of God v. Superior Court" poses two first amend-
ment questions. The first of these is whether the appointment of a
receiver based upon charitable trust theory violates the first amend-
ment's prohibition against establishment of religion; and the second is
whether a receiver's extensive involvement in church affairs violates
the first amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion.9
" 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
" Id. at 776.
Id. at 784.
See I.R.C. § 501(h). I.R.C. § 501(h) might be subject to a first amendment challenge
similar to the one which resulted in the Massachusetts statute being held constitutionally
infirm.
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
" Id. at 466.
"Id. at 464-66.
10 People v. Worldwide Church of God, No. C 267 607 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979),
mandamus denied, Worldwide Church of God v. Superior Court, No. 31091 (Cal. March 22,
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1846 (1980), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 2974 (1980) (dismissed from L.A. Super. Ct., Oct. 16, 1980).
"I Worldwide Church also poses two additional constitutional questions: whether the use
of different standards in receivership cases when business and nonprofit corporations are
assessed for, or subjected to, receivership violates equal protection guarantees; and
whether the appointment of a receiver with powers such as those of the receiver in this
case abridges fourth amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure. The
vitality of the second of these additional questions is substantiated by the church's subse-
quent petition for certiorari on fourth amendment grounds. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S.




The establishment clause" stands for the proposition that the govern-
ment shall not become excessively entangled in religious affairs. 3 En-
tanglement can be either administrative or political. 4 Administratively,
the prohibition is against excessive governmental surveillance of
religious affairs and improper resolution of religious disputes. Politi-
cally, the caution is against advancing the cause of one religion as opposed
to that of any other.99
The appointment of a receiver for church property may pose prob-
lems under both the administrative and the political thrusts of the
establishment clause. The first potential problem is apparent. As an
agent of the court which is an institution of the state, the receiver
would be in control of church property; the receiver can dispose of the
property or acquire additional property. In this situation, the state, for
all practical purposes, is operating the church and, in so doing, acting to
establish a religion in violation of the establishment clause. The second
potential problem may not be immediately apparent, as it is grounded in
the problem of standing. This problem results when a state asserts an
independent interest in the cause of action on the basis of a charitable
trust or similar theory. Utilizing a charitable trust rationale, the state
may contend that the assets of the church are held in trust for the peo-
ple of the state and that the state has powers of supervision and inter-
vention as parens patriae. If such a theory is used, continuous entangle-
ment is the unfortunate, but logical, result.
Receivers: Conservers of Secular Property
The charge that the mere appointment of a receiver constitutes a con-
stitutionally prohibited establishment of religion can be paried either by
denying that the state is involved in religion or by denying that the
state's involvement is impermissible.97 The most direct way to deny
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'3 It is conceded that total separation of church and state is impossible; thus, the issue is
one of determining whether the interaction is excessive. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970).
9' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866-80 (1978).
'5 Id. Excessive surveillance also impinges upon a believer's free exercise. Similarly, giv-
ing an advantage to one church, while withholding the same advantage from another, in-
hibits the second's free exercise vis a vis the first. Thus, even in theory, a total separation
of the establishment from the free exercise clause is impossible. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 568 (West 1979).
A third way to refute this establishment argument emphasizes form over substance,
claiming that the receiver is not, properly speaking, a representative of the state and,
therefore, no state establishment can be found. This position dubs the receiver a "represen-
tative," not an "agent," of the court. Since
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state involvement in religion is to divide the life of a religious organiza-
tion into secular and religious spheres, and to give the receiver power
over only secular activities, leaving the religious in the hands of the ap-
propriate ecclesiastical authorities. This conceptual dichotomy might be
termed the dual-separate entity theory. Such a dichotomy is implicit in
the receivership order in Worldwide Church," and recognizes that the
corporate existence of a church is distinct and separable from its
spiritual life. Churches incorporate for the pragmatic reasons of holding
property and limiting liability. These pragmatic reasons cannot be con-
fused with worship.
The distinction between the corporate and the religious existence of a
church was recently noted in Barr v. United Methodist Church.99 There,
the defendant church objected to service of process, claiming that it was
not a jural entity capable of being sued. The court affirmed a dual-
separate entity theory, reasoning that to hold the corporate entity liable
would neither "affect the distribution of power or property within the
denomination" nor "modify or interfere with the modes of worship af-
fected by Methodists."'I Applying this reasoning to the Worldwide
Church situation, when a receiver is appointed he is only a receiver of
the corporate property, and his appointment leaves the religious life of
the church intact. To the extent that there is state involvement in the
church entity, this involvement extends no further than the church's
secular life. Moreover, normally the corporate life of an organization
a court of law or equity cannot delegate its authority . . .the doctrine of
agency, can not apply with all its implications to the relationship of the court
and its receiver or the receiver and the parties to the suit, therefore, the
receiver can not be in the full sense of the word an agent of the court.
1 R. CLARK, supra note 13, § 36 (footnotes omitted).
" The receiver took control of all church assets and was directed to carry out all of the
activities and operation of the church, see note 15 & accompanying text supra, but he was
not "to interfere in any way with the ecclesiastical functions of the Church (as distinguished
from the College or the Foundation)," see note 21 supra. Note that the court's
secular/religious dichotomy seems to apply only to the church, and that no ecclesiastical
functions of the college or foundation appear to be recognized. This reasoning is highly
questionable inasmuch as the raison d'6tre for religious schools and foundations is
evangelism and service as the religion's doctrine defines these terms.
Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51 P. 841 (1897), was a suit brought
by dissident church members, challenging the right of the presbytery to divide a local
church and its assets between the two resulting congregations. In suggesting in dictum that
the presbytery had the power to disband the church, but lacked the power to divide the
assets, the California Supreme Court stated:
The corporation is a subordinate factor in the life and purposes of the church
itself. A religious corporation ... is something peculiar to itself. Its function
and object is to stand in the capacity of an agent holding the title to the prop-
erty, with power to manage and control the same in accordance with the in-
terest of the spiritual ends of the church.
Id at 483, 51 P. at 843.
90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rtpr. 322 (1979).
1 Id. at 274, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
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which has been placed in receivership will continue under the direction
of its own corporate officers even though the receiver may be present to
ensure the preservation of corporate property."1 Where corporate of-
ficers remain in office and the receiver is purely an overseer of the
secular life of the church corporation, state involvement would seem
very slight.
The legitimacy, however, of the distinction between the corporate life
of the church and its religious life is highly questionable."2 Economic
considerations certainly reveal the theoretical weakness of the
dichotomy. Property is power, and there is no reason for a church to
own property save for its religious purposes. Thus, the power to control
the disposition or use of property is the power to further or to frustrate
religious purposes.' 3 Doubtful as it is that the dual-separate entity
theory is viable in the abstract, it is even more doubtful that the theory
is a workable one, amenable to practical application. A basic reason for
this is that the inquiry which is essential to distinguish the religous
from the secular entails the inquiry into what is doctrinally essential to
the religion. This inquiry is, however, constitutionally prohibited. Since
even the secular life of a church is still part of the life of a church, the
appointment of a receiver must pass the current test for any potential
establishment clause violation as announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman."4
Lemon invalidated state statutes which authorized salary sup-
plements to teachers in parochial schools and the purchase of educa-
tional services from nonpublic schools.0 5 To meet the Lemon establish-
ment clause test, a state statute must have been enacted with a secular
purpose, neither advance nor inhibit religion and not excessively en-
tangle the state in church affairs.' Viewed in the light most advan-
tageous to the state, receivership statutes meet the first requirement of
the Lemon test because they have the purpose of preserving the prop-
erty at issue in litigation.' To the extent that the statutes can be invoked
by plaintiff churches to protect their own claims, these statutes are even-
handed in their operation.' Thus, the second prerequisite of validity is
satisfied in that receivership statutes neither advance nor inhibit
religion, but merely maintain the status quo until trial. The activities of a
receiver, such as those of the receiver in Worldwide Church, do,
101 But see Sunset Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 2d 389, 50 P.2d 106 (1935).
12 See note 98 supra.
"' See McKeag, The Problem of Resolving Property Disputes in Hierarchical Churches,
48 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 281 (1977).
"4 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
105 Id. at 609, 611.
"4 Id. at 612-13.
10 See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
"4 Cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (dictum) (conscientious objector
statute cannot establish traditional religion).
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however, violate the third prong of the Lemon test. There is excessive
governmental entanglement in Worldwide Church and similar situations,
even though the statute has a secular purpose and a neutral practical ef-
fect.
This conclusion follows from New York v. Cathedral Academy."9 In
that case the school relied on a New York statute authorizing payments
to nonpublic schools for expenses incurred similar to the statute declared
unconstitutional in Lemon. Invalidating the New York statute, the
Supreme Court noted that the New York Court of Appeals had construed
it as requiring a detailed audit to substantiate all claims submitted, and
then proceeded to reason:
But even if such an audit were contemplated, we agree with the ap-
pellant that this sort of detailed inquiry into the subtle implications of
in-class examinations and other teaching activities would itself con-
stitute a significant encroachment on the protections of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. In order to prove their claims for reim-
bursement, sectarian schools would be placed in the position of trying
to disprove any religious content in various classroom materials. In
order to fulfill its duty to resist any possibly unconstitutional pay-
ment ... the State as defendant would have to undertake a search for
religious meaning in every classroom examination offered in support
of a claim. And to decide the case, the Court of Claims would be cast
in the role of arbiter of the essentially religious dispute."'
Directing a church corporation receiver "to employ ... accountants,
auditors, and attorneys to conduct a thorough audit of the financial and
business dealings of the Church"'' conflicts with Cathedral Academy's
admonition that state examination of the records of a religious entity
constitutes impermissible entanglement. The bookkeeper's intrusion in
Cathedral Academy and in the receivership order in Worldwide
Church' seems sufficient to make the former controlling. There is,
however, more: both Cathedral Academy and Worldwide Church in-
volve courts exercising their equitable powers. In the former, equity
was prohibited from acting on behalf of a parochial school to mitigate
the actual unfairness of denying the parochial school's reliance interest
because so to act would excessively entangle church and state.' In the
434 U.S. 125 (1977).
II Id. at 132-33.
,1 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, app. E, at 31.
"1 Cathedral Academy also stands for disapproval of the receivership order's failure to
recognize the ecclesiastical function of the college defendant in Worldwide Church. See
notes 21 & 98 supra.
"I Cathedral Academy must be read not only in conjunction with Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon 1), but also with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon
II). Lemon I invalidated Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes authorizing purchase of
services from parochial schools. Lemon II approved an order authorizing the distribution of
funds by Pennsylvania to reimburse parochial schools for expenses incurred prior to Lemon
I. In a four to three decision, with one concurrence, the four justice plurality accepted the
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latter, equity sought to act to mitigate the possible unfairness to the in-
terests of others via the appointment of a receiver. If equity is pro-
hibited from acting to mitigate actual unfairness, equity would seem to
be more forcefully prohibited from acting to mitigate possible un-
fairness.
The frequently criticized"1 4 result of Walz v. Tax Commission ' but-
tresses the excessive entanglement conclusion reached in Cathedral
Academy. In Walz, the Court upheld New York's tax exemption for
religious properties used solely for religious worship. While property
tax exemption would seem to establish religion, it does not prefer one
church to another since the benefit is extended to all churches. More im-
portantly, the Court reasoned that affording a tax exemption results in
less entanglement than would taxing church property which would en-
tail evaluating the property and perhaps instituting procedures for tax
liens and foreclosures as well.1 8 "[E]xtensive state investigation into
church operation and finances" is to be avoided."' Thus, both Cathedral
Academy and Walz support the contention that the establishment
clause is violated by a neutral receivership statute which is applied to
authorize extensive surveillance of a church's "secular" affairs. This is
especially true since a purportedly neutral receivership remedy may be
impossible to apply without involving excessive entanglement.1
reliance reasoning of the lower court in light of the one time nature of the payments. Four
years later, in Cathedral Academy, six justices rejected the New York legislature's effort
to protect the reliance interest of New York nonpublic schools. In a six to three decision,
the majority explicitly rejected the Lemon II equity argument of reliance. 434 U.S. at 134.
The Court's effort to distinguish Lemon II is unconvincing, practically speaking, and may
stand for no more than the proposition that a legislature will not be allowed, in the face of
an injunction, to bestow via statute, the equitable relief a court would grant by decree.
"' See, e.g., M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, THE RELIGIOUS EMPIRE (1976).
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
" Id. at 674.
117 Id at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Typically, establishment clause cases turn upon the presence of a statute which directly
bears upon organized religion. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (in-
validating a statute allowing public purchase of educational services from parochial
schools); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding selective service regula-
tion regarding conscientious objectors); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding
religious property tax exemption); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a
statute authorizing district boards of education to reimburse parents of parochial students
for bus fares). Facially neutral statutes are commonly analyzed under the free exercise
clause. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance
statute); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensation statute);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor statute). Nonetheless, the majority
in Walz suggested that even a facially neutral statute may violate the establishment clause
by its application: "Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must . . .turn on
whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious
beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so." 397 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added).
,, Even if emphasis is improperly placed upon Walz' dictum, see note 117 supra, the very
nature of a receivership would seem impermissible. Where personal property is the subject
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Charitable Trust Theory: The Political Establishment of Religion
The charitable trust theory"9 was invoked by California in Worldwide
Church to justify state intervention in the affairs of a church in general
and the appointment of a receiver in particular.10 If this theory were
taken literally, the state would have been in the position of arguing that
it is continuously entangled in the work of the church; not temporarily
involved during litigation, but continuously, as it functions as parens
patriae at all times.' This activity, as has been noted," is prohibited.
Much more serious, however, than any conceptual problems posed by
the literal interpretation of a legal fiction are the difficulties en-
countered in the practical application of the charitable trust theory.
California courts have claimed that
the acceptance of ... assets [by a nonprofit] establishes a charitable
trust for the declared corporate purposes as effectively as though the
assets had been accepted from a donor who had expressly provided in
the instrument evidencing the gift that it was to be held in trust
solely for such charitable purposes.m
of receivership, it may be possible for a receiver to act as a warehouseman and keep the
property under lock and key. Such a situation, however, would be the exception rather than
the rule. Most receivers, especially those of corporations, cannot avoid monitoring and ex-
amining accounts and records. But see Note, supra note 82, at 277-79.
11 The true ground [of charity law] is that the property given to a charity
becomes in a measure public property, only applicable as far as may be, it is
true, to the specific purposes to which it is devoted, but within those limits
consecrated to the public use and become [sic] part of the public resources for
promoting the happiness and well-being of the people of the State."
Late Corp. of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 59 (1890).
'" See text accompanying notes 14-15, supra. In addition to the charitable trust theory,
attempts can be made to justify state examination of the affairs of nonprofits along two
other lines. First, nonprofits fill roles in the community which otherwise would have to be
filled by the state. Therefore, the nonprofit is really performing the job of the state. See
generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); D.
ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 192-93 (1968). Second, in recognition of their
charitable services, nonprofits are frequently given tax exempt status. In addition to not
being taxed on property or income, I.R.C. § 501, contributions to nonprofits may be deducti-
ble to the individual taxpayer, id. § 170(a). Thus, nonprofits are really operating with
government dollars since the dollars with which they operate have been allowed to remain
in the private or quasi-public sector only by the largesse of government. Regardless of their
applicability to most nonprofits, the impropriety of these justifications where a church is
the nonprofit should be obvious:
Government could provide or finance operas, hospitals, historical societies,
and all the rest because they represent social welfare programs within the
reach of the police power. In contrast, government may not provide or finance
worship because of the Establishment Clause any more than it may single out
"atheistic" or "agnostic" centers or groups and create or finance them.
Walz v. Tax Commn', 397 U.S. at 708-09 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"' Continuous involvement would be difficult to accept even for the majority in Lemon II
which observed that it was only ratifying a "cleanup" operation which would not recur. 411
U.S. at 202. See note 113 supra.
'= See notes 115-16 & accompanying text supra.
12 Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 852, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (1953).
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To ascertain whether those assets are being properly handled by the
charitable trustees, the courts can inquire into whether the assets are
being handled in accordance with the charity's bylaws.' This means
that courts must interpret the purpose of a charity to insure that there
is no departure from that purpose in contravention of the "terms" of the
trust.'" Where a church is concerned, however, such inquiry would
parallel the inquiry necessitated by the implied trust doctrine declared
unconstitutional in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Presbyterian Church."8
Blue Hull was a church property dispute between rival factions of the
same congregation. As a matter of Georgia law, church property was
held subject to an implied trust; if there was a departure from the
original doctrine of the church, the property was subject to forfeiture.
Thus, Georgia courts were obligated from the outset in church property
disputes to determine whether a departure from doctrine had
occurred." This departure from doctrine inquiry was found objec-
tionable in light of the establishment clause.1" Therefore, to comport
with the Constitution and avoid impermissible interference with
religion, courts that are called upon to resolve church property disputes
are free to adopt any one of three approaches: they may enforce major-
ity decisions where the church has a congregational polity or the deci-
sions of the highest ecclesiastical authority where the church polity is
hierarchical; they may rely upon "neutral principles of law," looking to
deeds, reverter clauses and general state corporation law; or they may
enforce state statutes which govern church property but which preclude
interference in church doctrine.1 Even where hierarchical churches are
involved, it is now clear that courts need not blindly defer to ecclesiasti-
cal tribunals, but may invoke "neutral principles of law" in resolving the
dispute.30
Georgia's implied trust theory, invalidated by Blue Hull, is not dis-
cernibly different from California's charitable trust theory. The at-
torney general's ascertainment of whether he will bring a cause of ac-
tion against the nonprofit church corporation necessitates the forbidden
1.. See, e.g., Samoan Congregational Christian Church in the United States v. Samoan
Congregational Christian Church of Oceanside, 66 Cal. App. 3d 69, 135 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1977).
", This inquiry into purpose has prevented the closing of a religious hospital and the
opening of neighborhood clinics in its stead, Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal.
App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977), and declared unacceptable the distribution of assets
elected by members of a dissolving local church. See note 133 & accompanying text infra.
' 393 U.S. 440 (1969); see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
" See 393 U.S. at 443-44.
12 Id at 449-50.
12 Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
120 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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theological assessment of the church's neutral documents. The court's
ascertainment of whether it will entertain the cause of action requires
the same doctrinal inquiry. While legal fictions such as the charitable
trust theory were a useful tool in years past for protecting minority
rights,131 Blue Hull made it clear that they could no longer be used
where the nonprofit is a church" 2 and that, in at least this area, legal
theory had come of age.
It is apparent, however, that California courts have not recognized
Blue Hull as controlling. This amaurosis is illustrated not only by
Worldwide Church, but also by a strain of other cases, the most notable
being the voluhtary dissolution proceeding of In re Metropolitan Baptist
Church of Richmond, Inc.' Denying the unanimous petition of the
church membership to distribute its assets among three Baptist
churches, a Baptist seminary and a serviceman's center, the court looked
to the avowed purpose in petitioner's articles of incorporation, namely,
"founding and conducting... a Baptist church in Richmond ... to preach
and teach the Scriptures in that city in essential accord with the beliefs
of fundamental Baptist churches."" The court ruled that one Baptist
church was too distant, that a seminary was not a church and that the
serviceman's center was both too distant and too secular. This deter-
mination, rationalized by the court as pursuant to "neutral principles of
law," ' would have been impossible to make without asking which
theological tenets are most central to being a Baptist-the analysis pro-
hibited by .Blue Hull.
Blue Hull's sequel, Jones v. Wolf,"'6 gave unqualified affirmation to
the neutral principles doctrine and recognized a corporate charter as a
"neutral document. ' "1 7 Nevertheless, finding a neutral document is not
the same as interpreting that document in light of the controversy:
In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special
care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not to
rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document in-
dicates that the parties have intended to create a trust. [If religious
,' Sutter, supra note 76, at 236.
15 Even where the charity is not a church, the policy basis for invoking such theories
may be questioned. "Today, many of the gifts for non-profit corporations are given by non-
members, corporations, or with no limitations. In light of these gifts, it becomes difficult for
courts to justify using an implied trust where the donor has made no specific request that
the 'creed' of the corporation be continued." Id. For a discussion of the implied trust theory,
see L. TRIBE, supra note 94, at 872-80.
'u 48 Cal. App. 3d 850, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1975).
Id at 855, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
'" See id. at 859, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 904.




precepts are involved], then the court must defer to the resolution of
the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body."
It is extremely unlikely that neither religious purposes nor doctrines
would appear in the purpose clause of a religious organization's constitu-
tion or charter. Finding the "neutral" document is useless unless one
understands what it means, and interpretation is necessary for under-
standing. Given the articles of incorporation at issue in Metropolitan
Baptist, that court would minimally have had to reason that the con-
gregational polity process by which Baptists make decisions is less
essential to being a Baptist, and therefore more easily disregarded by
courts, than other elements of the Baptist faith.
Although Metropolitan Baptist's dissolution action may be factually
distinguishable from Worldwide Church's receivership action, the
charitable trust theory provides the common denominator. Metropolitan
Baptist can be understood as standing for the proposition that courts
will not listen even to the express wishes of current and future con-
tributors or members if a charitable trust has been imposed. Worldwide
Church may illustrate the validity of this generalization in that the
court affirmed the receiver's interception of a communication from the
Pastor General to the membership and enjoined the defendants "from
attempting to divert voluntary contributions from being sent ... where
the receiver could take possession of them." ' 9 The receiver's action
raises questions of jurisdiction and authority beyond the scope of this
note. It is sufficient to observe that if the theory to be invoked is the
charitable trust theory, the receiver seems to have prevented con-
tributors from impressing their contributions with their own wishes.
Together, Metropolitan Baptist and Worldwide Church pose the con-
undrum of how the charitable trust theory could ever allow a nonprofit
church corporation to amend its articles of incorporation to avow a new
purpose. If such an amendment is impossible because of the prior in-
volvement of the state as parens patriae, the establishment clause is
politically infringed. Indeed, the parens patriae rationale stands for a
continuing involvement in the affairs of the church. If the impossibility
of amending the articles is only a present impossibility due to the
state's intervention at the time of suit, the infringement could more ap-
propriately be characterized as one of the free exercise of religion.
The Free Exercise Issue
An act which establishes one individual's religion may infringe upon
another individual's free exercise of a different religion. ' For this
"' IdM at 604.
'8' Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 9.
,, See note 95 supra.
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reason, the free exercise discussion complements the preceding estab-
lishment discussion. Legislative acts which have had a minimal and in-
direct impact upon religion and whose purpose and primary impact lay
elsewhere have been found to violate the free exercise clause."' Thus,
state corporation statutes which authorize state intervention into, or ex-
amination of, the affairs of churches in the form of receivership may
violate the free exercise clause as applied.
The application of the receivership statute in Worldwide Church in-
volved the appointment of a receiver who acted under the aegis of the
court and thus had the imprimatur of the state.' The petitioners alleged
that the receiver laid off employees, including ministers; hired a
disfellowshiped church member to work at church headquarters against
the express beliefs of the church; and caused a financial loss resulting in
the elimination or reduction of youth programs, educational programs,
evangelistic efforts and. travel subsidies to religious meetings.' If
proven, these activities would clearly involve free exercise interests
and raise free exercise clause questions.
To deprive an individual of his free exercise of religion is to deprive
him of a fundamental first amendment right.' Such deprivation is only
permissible if there is a compelling state interest.'' Compelling in-
terests have been found where the public health,"' morality"1 and
safety'48 have been at stake. 9
The freedom guaranteed to practice religion is not unlimited;'50 a two
part balancing test has been utilized to determine whether a depriva-
tion is permissible:
First, the persons claiming an exception from the regulation must
show that it burdens the practice of their religion .... Second, the
restriction on the free exercise of religion will be balanced against
the importance of the state interest in the regulation. Even if the
state interest appears to be of a greater magnitude [ie., a compelling
interest], the regulation will be invalid unless it burdens religion no
more than is necessary to promote the overriding secular interest.
This "least restrictive means" test is merely another way of saying
that an important state interest will not justify the limitation of the
free exercise of religion unless an exemption for religiously
' See note 117 & accompanying text supra.
1 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, app. F.
" See note 27 supra.
4 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
14 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
148 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination
statute).
See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (bigamy statute).
148 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (solicitation statute).
848 See C. ANTIEAU. T. BURKE & P. CARROLL, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
65-99 (1965).
" See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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motivated activity would unduly interfere with the achievement of
that state interest.151
Early free exercise cases took a different approach. In accord with
the once favored substantive due process analysis whereby the Court
attempted to give specific content to general rights by looking to prin-
ciples of natural law, 152 the Court declared that some first amendment
disputes involved proscribed activity "beyond the limit" of free exercise
protection.153 Bigamy'" and fraud155 were beyond the limits of the free
exercise of religion clause even as the first amendment's guarantee of
free speech did not extend to crying fire in a theater.5 ' As balancing
tests fall into disfavor, one might anticipate that the notion of a "limit"
would gain some resurgence in free exercise cases.57
The analysis of the potential problem posed by state receivership and
intervenor statutes as applied to churches will differ little, if at all,
under a balancing test or the concept of a "limit." For defendants in
Worldwide Church to have prevailed under a balancing test, they would
have had to show that the receivership statute or the charitable trust
theory burdened their practice of religion. Assuming that showing, the
burden would have shifted to the state to show its interest and its effec-
tuation by the least restrictive means possible in terms of inhibiting
J" . NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 879 (1978). The compelling
state interest-least restrictive alternative test for the free exercise clause is first enun-
ciated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The fact that the statute in Sherbert was
"religion blind" did not save it. L. TRIBE. supra note 94, at 852. "[Flailure to accommodate
religion when the government could substantially achieve its legitimate goals while grant-
ing religious exemptions has been disapproved as hostility toward religion rather than hail-
ed as the essence of neutrality." Id (footnote omitted).
1 See J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. supra note 151, at 385-91.
11 Thus, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), an Idaho statute proscribing bigamy was
upheld as applied to Mormons. The reasoning of Justice Field was categorical rather than
syllogistic. "It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be invoked as a
protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order
and morals of society." I& at 342. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court
reversed the conviction of certain Jehovah's Witnesses who had been convicted under
statutes which prohibited solicitation without a permit where the official charged with issu-
ing the permits was required to do so only if he determined that the cause was religious.
Nonetheless, Justice Roberts proceeded to comment:
Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak
of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public. Cer-
tainly penal laws are available to punish such conduct. Even the exercise of
religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that the State may pro-
tect its citizens from injury.
Id at 306.
.. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). See generally note 82 supra.
11 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
1" Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
112 Public commercial speech, for example, has recently been affirmed as subject to the
limit of "false, deceptive, and misleading" in the midst of a balancing opinion. See Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
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defendants' free exercise of religion. The receiver's hiring of a disfellow-
shiped member to work at church headquarters against the express
beliefs of the church should have been sufficient to show that the state
had burdened defendant's religion, for it was forbidden for members of
the church to associate with the disfellowshiped.'" At this point, the
onus would have shifted to the state to show that it had a compelling
state interest.
Three compelling state interests could have been advanced by Califor-
nia; in fact, only the charitable trust theory was proffered. " It is dif-
ficult to imagine this legal fiction rising to the level of a compelling
reason. Where gifts are given "without restriction," it would be the
height of folly for the state to insist that they were really given with the
restriction imposed by the purpose clause now existing in the non-
profit's articles of incorporation. Aside from this, even if the implied
trust were a faithful reflection of the real world, it still would not rise to
the level of a compelling interest. Moreover, even if the state could
demonstrate such a need, the least restrictive means test remains. The
work of the receiver might be prolonged without the knowledge the
disfellowshiped member brings to the receivership, but this is precisely
what the least restrictive means test is about. The force of the test is
not to promote efficiency in state regulation, but to allow the state to in-
trude, where intrusion is essential, in the most de minimus manner
possible.
A second compelling state interest could be found in the need to pro-
tect minority rights."' If the minority lacks standing or the motivation
to protect itself, the state may have an interest in preventing their sub-
jugation. Even assuming that this is an interest which could approach
the necessary compelling status, the hiring of a disfellowshiped member
would not seem to meet this goal or the least restrictive means test.
Moreover, if the rights of individual members are involved,"5 ' courts
should move cautiously for two reasons. First, the principle of member
consent in the case of voluntary associations is well recognized. Mem-
bers may surrender certain constitutional rights by affiliating with the
association and regain them only upon severing the connection.' Sec-
ond, the deprivation of individual liberty alleged may be no more than a
theological schism with the practical outcome of a church property
11 See note 27 supra.
" See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11; text accompanying note 14 supra.See notes 67-69 & accompanying text supra.
Complaints regarding the Worldwide Church of God were made to the attorney
general by six individuals who were given relator status. These individuals subsequently
dropped out of the suit. Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 1-2.




dispute. ' Conceivably, a minority, or a majority not entitled to church
property,'" might find itself declared a majority or otherwise entitled to
the property if the majority or those theoretically entitled to the prop-
erty were replaced as were the defendants in Worldwide Church. The
courts cannot be placed in the position of making decisions on how the
church should allocate its resources so as to best stay within the con-
fines of church doctrine.
A third compelling state interest might have been found in the allega-
tions of the attorney general in Worldwide Church.'5 If true, these
allegations could amount to fraud. The prevention of fraud would seem
to be a compelling interest of the state. It can be argued that when a
receiver and the state act to prevent fraud, religion is not burdened; but
this contention is persuasive only where no legitimate religious activity
is present. Where that activity is present, however, religion is burdened
and the burden can be justified only by the state's compelling interest in
preventing fraud. Even then, appointment of a receiver may not be the
least restrictive means188 and each of the receiver's acts should be
measured against the compelling interest-least restrictive means test.
The fraud rationale cannot, without more, do the double duty of both
justifying the intrusion and validating all that happens in the process of
the intrusion."7
A result different from that arrived at under such a balancing test
may be reached if the state's actions were measured against the limit
test. Under the limit test, the Supreme Court tends to look more closely
at the alleged conduct of the defendant and less closely at the coercive
nature of the statute.'8 In Worldwide Church the alleged activity was
misuse of church funds and self-dealing, seemingly bringing Worldwide
Church within the scope of Davis v. Beason.9 and the dicta of Cantwell
v. Connecticut.7 ' Therefore, the limit test might have condoned Cali-
'"' It has been suggested that the six relators were, in fact, part of a disenchanted seg-
ment of the church which had previously broken away. Post-Guyana Hysteria, supra note
10, at 3.
16 See notes 107-30 & accompanying text supra. See generally note 82 supra.
See notes 13, 19 & accompanying text supra. Fraud is not religion and the state's in-
terest in its prevention is recognized. See note 148 & accompanying text supra.
' If an injunction could have served the same purpose as the receivership, California
might fail to meet the least restrictive means test. See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
167 See L. TRIBE, supra note 94, at 855.
164 "[W]e do not intimate or suggest... that any conduct can be made a religious rite and
by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First Amendment." Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
161 133 U.S. 333 (1890); see note 153 supra.
",0 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see note 153 supra. Legislation such as prohibitions against for-
tune telling, which is designed to prevent fraud, frequently prompts claims that the pro-
scribed conduct is necessary for an individual's practice of religion. Typically, courts
recognize the constitutionality of such statutes. Few cases deal with the issue of whether
the practice the state seeks to prohibit is fraud or religion. The determining factor may be
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fornia's imposition of a receiver. Condoning the imposition of a receiver,
however, must be kept analytically distinct from condoning the acts of
the receiver. To continue with the illustration of hiring the disfellow-
shiped member, it is not self-evident that the state must strike out at
fraud by this means. Less restrictive means should be available. Thus,
while the limit test might have validated the receiver's appointment,
the test would not commit courts to an acceptance of the receiver's ac-
tions without question."'
CONCLUSION
Worldwide Church has significance as a nonprofit case and as a first
amendment case -the former in that it illustrates the inadequacy of the
law which was applied, the latter in that it illustrates the special con-
siderations arising when the corporation is also a church. Much non-
profit litigation, Worldwide Church included, reflects a tension between
the individual rights of both minorities and majorities and the rights of
the state. In years past, individuals wishing to bring actions against
nonprofit corporations have experienced standing problems for want of
economic injury. The literature is replete with commentaries on the
rights of members of associations' and the difficulties encountered hav-
ing rights of action recognized . 7 The problem of making nonprofit cor-
porations accountable, however, is not to be met by relaxing the stan-
dards by which they are to be held accountable or by reference to legal
fictions such as the charitable trust theory. These are substitutes for
analysis.
Worldwide Church offers the opportunity not only to clarify the scope
of first amendment protection available to religious organizations facing
receivership actions, but also to examine the treatment of nonprofit cor-
porations in general and their rights in receivership actions in par-
ticular. As California courts apply the new Nonprofit Corporation Code,
Worldwide Church invites reassessment of the charitable trust theory
which has been a part of California statutory and common law.
As a first amendment case, Worldwide Church is significant both as
an establishment and a free exercise case. Courts have assumed that the
no more than whether compensation is involved. See C. ANTIEAU, T. BURKE & P. CARROLL,
supra note 149, at 84-85.
It is noteworthy that the recent action of the California legislature, see note 82 supra,
seems to capitulate needlessly on the free exercise question. Where capitulation is both
total and unwarranted, credibility is lent to the hypothesis that lobbying has been intensive
on a highly emotional issue.
1 But see Note, supra note 82, at 277.
7 See generally Chafee, supra note 162, at 1008.
. See generally Baker, Community Development Corporations: A Legal Analysis, 12
VAL. U.L. REv. 33 (1978).
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secular affairs of a religious organization are separable from its ec-
clesiastical affairs. If courts are to resolve conflicts where religious
bodies are parties, this assumption must be made. More care, however,
must be taken in distinguishing the secular from the ecclesiastical. A
receivership order of the breadth of that in Worldwide Church blurs the
distinction it purports to recognize.
An examination of the imposition of a receivership, grounded on the
charitable trust theory, has shown that both the establishment and free
exercise clauses are jeopardized when the candidate for receivership is
a religious organization. The untenability of the secular-ecclesiastical
theory thrusts the receiver into the religious life of the church, and the
receiver's duties necessarily involve him in the detailed examination of
religion prohibited by the establishment clause. Similarly, it does not
appear that the receivership remedy can be justified under the compel-
ling state interest-least restrictive means test currently used by the
United States Supreme Court. Certainly in Worldwide Church no com-
pelling state interest was shown. Even if that showing had been made,
California would still have had to show that receivership placed less
restriction on church members' free exercise than other alternatives,
such as injunctive relief.
Jurisprudentially, Worldwide Church invites a re-examination of the
charitable trust doctrine. Typically, minority rights have not been pro-
tected in nonprofit corporations. The charitable trust theory has served
to protect minority rights but at the expense of perpetuating a legal fic-
tion which, if taken literally, would serve to establish a religion in viola-
tion of the first amendment. In the absence of a clearly reasoned theory
of minority rights, there is no guarantee that nonprofit corporations will
not be harrassed even as for-profit corporations have been harrassed.
At the other extreme, to make minority rights dependent upon state ac-
tion may cause those rights to be lost in the absence of a sympathetic at-
torney general. In the presence of an overzealous attorney general, on
the other hand, even the smallest minority could become a majority and
the largest of majorities be transformed into a minority.
Nonprofits and churches alike pose unique problems for courts. These
problems are neither to be resolved by heedless disregard of clearly
enunciated constitutional principles nor by the unthinking application of
principles and remedies from other areas of law. Adjudication in this
area demands the construction of a new conceptual framework which
will comprehend the distinguishing features of the nonprofit and the
religious organization and which will embrace a sensitivity to the under-
lying constitutional considerations.
DARRELL R. SHEPARD
[Vol. 56:175
